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The industrial relations research is the first piece of research I have ever
done which started, in proper text book fashion, from a set of
hypotheses (a) about what the facts would prove to be, and (b) about
why the situation should be what it was predicted to be. It is also the
first piece of research in which I have relied on colleagues to collect the
data. Luckily, these two features are complementary. Everyone likes his
hypotheses to come true, and hence considerable dangers of selective
perception exist. It is an excellent corrective, therefore, if he has
collaborators who, while sharing a strong common interest in getting to
the bottom of things and finding out 'how it works', would prefer on
balance that the hypotheses should prove to be wrong!
It has turned out, as Maureen Mackintosh says in her paper, to be a
contentious area. Generally, I have found that it is not only
neo-classical economists who dislike my hypotheses (after all the
possibility of devising genuinely exciting models of labour market
functioning if wage employment is as 'corporatist' as I suggest is much
reduced even if one does retreat to the curious term 'internal market' to
make the best of a bad job), but also those who would consider
themselves as 'on the left'. The alliance, of course, is not at all unusual;
both neo-classicals and the hard-nosed left share the assumption that
for all their blatherings about love and duty and status and loyalty what
really makes men and women tick is hard material interest. But I think
that is not all there is to it. There are, I think, several other reasons why
people of left-wing views should consider my hypotheses distasteful:
because those hypotheses seem to assume the viability of a kind of
corporatist pattern in industry in which workers are willing to
co-operate with managers even though they are placed in an explicitly
subordinate position; because they consequently rule oit the likelihood
of a rising tide of class consciousness leading to revolutionary social
change; because they place little importance on the dependency
relationship and the question of domestic or foreign ownership in
determining patterns of industrial employment; or because
contrariwise, the hypotheses assume that the early developers remain
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the chief innovators and late developers get most of their ideas and
institutions by imitation rather than innovation.
Perhaps another reason was that in postulating the mechanisms which
explain the expected pattern, the hypotheses gave (extrapolating from
what I knew of Japanese history) a very large role to the initiative of
managers. One thing that does emerge pretty clearly from our research
in all three countries is that any assumption that employers in late
developing countries would generally go through the same process of
creating a Japanese-type system as their Japanese counterparts had in
the 1910s and 1920s, is wrong. (There is perhaps one exception: the
Mexican group which owns the brewery and steel mill described by
Miguel Sanchez Padron. It showed much the same management-led
development as Japanese firms - but almost contemporaneously; it is a
group with a long history).
Thus it is, as both Maureen Mackintosh and Miguel Sanchez Padron
point out, that some of the features which we expected to find are
there but not for the reasons which were originally postulated. The
protected status of permanent workers, the practices of internal
promotion, are imposed by the state in Senegal, and by the pressure of
unions backed by the law in Mexico.
This points up one very important feature of 'later' late development:
the fact that the mechanisms which form a country's internal
institutions - e.g. of the labour market - are increasingly world-wide in
extent. The practices of the 'Japanese system' were gradually
institutionalized in Japan as the result of the initiatives of a number of
individual managements (and in the post-war period individual unions)
gradually becoming diffused through the country by the forces of
imitation and competition and only subsequently being reinforced by
any legal changes. Foreign countries played only a small part in this,
providing some models - the management policies of Krupp and
National Cash Register, for instance - and providing warnings of the
class conflict which lay ahead if some thought was not taken to avoid
it. The workers in Senegal, however, get some of the same institutions
because France, re-constructing its social institutions in the post-war
period, (unlike England which had no such occasion for deliberate
social reconstruction and is still agonizing over the process ten years
after the appointment of the Donovan Commission) could embody in
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authoritative law some of the accumulated demands of French unions
which 'enlightened' employers were prepared to concede, and because
these laws were then diffused to the colonies partly thanks to the
demands of colonial unions which would settle for nothing less in the
way of rights than those which had become the norm in the
metropolitan country.
So the process of institutionalization of employment systems becomes
a very complex one which cannot be traced only within the boundaries
of a single country - even one as large and in many ways culturally
self-sufficient as Mexico. One of the more interesting mechanisms
overlooked in the original hypotheses is the way In which external
examples raise the expectations of workers, give them the confidence to
demand concessions as of right, which sense of having justifiable
demands employers then have to reckon with. In all three countries, for
example, it appears that a man who has been in the same job category
at the same wage rate for many years without promotion or a personal
increment is likely to feel hard done by a factor which was both a
consequence of the increasing institutionalization of internal promotion
systems and a force which is in some cases helping to change job
structures, causing them to be designed to provide promotion
opportunities, as Miguel Sanchez Padron's example of the parallel
promotion chains in the tool-room and the paint-shop exemplify.
Senegal, with its cultural gulf between the predominantly French
management and Senegalese workers, shows little of the ideological
concomitants of the Japanese employment pattern - the deliberate
fostering of 'loyalty' to the firm, the stress of an ethic of craftsmanship
and service, the fostering of a sense of community. Such attempts are
more common in Mexico, but on the whole of no great consequence in
any of the three countries. Low labour turnover and 'permanent
employment' within the limits that it exists, (the greater mobility of
highly skilled workers in Mexico and even more in Senegal as shown in
these two papers are important exceptions to the general picture) are a
function rather of the shortage of jobs and of the fact that anyone who
is lucky enough to have one sticks to it. The mere fact of long-term, if
not lifetime, employment, does bring with it a number of other
features, however. Many of the welfare provisions which firms provide,
in Mexico and Sri Lanka as well as in Senegal, make sense from the
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employer's point of view only on the assumption that his present
workers are still likely for the most part to be with him in five years'
time; so also are their training programmes.
There is certainly not much evidence in Mexico or Sri Lanka, either of
incremental pay scales, or predictable promotion opportunities, being
deliberately provided by employers as a means of retaining skilled
workers in whose training they have invested. (The manager of the
Mexican firm whose 'company philosophy' Miguel Sanchez Padron
quotes is something of an exception). Where incremental scales are
found - as they are very widely in Sri Lanka, for instance - they are
the result either of the extension to industry of the practices of a
colonial bureaucracy, or of concessions gained by unions. One of the
reasons why this practice developed in Japan was that factory owners in
the upper tier of the dual structure could hire the young school leavers
who were clamouring to get into their factories, at extremely low rates
of pay which they could then raise to a bare family wage by the time
the young men were ready to get married. This required two things
missing in our three contemporary countries:
general acceptance of the principle of a person-related as opposed
to job-related wages, and
ability of employers to drive down the wages of new recruits to
the lowest rate which would assure supply.
The first condition is hardly fulfilled: the 'equal pay for equal work'
principle is probably a good deal more firmly entrenched in our three
countries than in Japan fifty years ago. But there are some exceptions,
as is shown for both countries, so that perhaps the second condition is
more important. Where minimum wage legislation is enforced - as in
the large-firm sector in Mexico, for example - employers cannot offer
their new recruits the low market rates which prevail in the informal
small scale sector. The two factors are inter-related; if employers cannot
gain the advantage of low initial rates of pay, they have less incentive to
try to push to a person-related, rather than a job-related Wage.
Of all the policy issues involved in this research, this one concerning the
principles which should govern wage payments - whether they should
be on an exclusively rate-for-the-job basis or whether, like university
salaries in this country, they should be on a person-related
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seniority/merit basis - is one of the most intriguing. It involves abstract
principles of justice, as well as theories of work motivation, and has
wide implications for social and political consciousness as well as for
productivity. And the difficult thing is that there is no clear one-to-one
relation between institutional form and social consequence. Managers in
state corporations in Sri Lanka have conditions of security and
predictable career prospects rather similar to those which in Japan seem
to be preconditions for the cohesion and co-operativeness in working
relationships which Japanese managers seem to display. But in Sri
Lanka's different ideological setting the consequences are rather
different. There seems to be a good deal of mutual suspicion, much
jockeying for position, a deliberate use of competition for stimulating
effort, little disposition to take initiatives which expose one's flank or
involve one in extra work. The lights in managers' offices do not so
often burn late into the night as they do in Japan. These differences in
the ideological and cultural setting, in the definitions of the purposes of
life and work which people bring into their offices and factories, are
immensely important.
The whole thrust of my industrial relations research since I began a
comparison between Britain and Japan eight years ago has been to
reduce the importance attributable in historical explanation to the
Paretian 'residues', to show how some of the features of Japanese or
Mexican industrial relations popularly ascribed to 'national character'
or 'cultural tradition' could instead be accounted for in a simpler
universalistic framework of explanation - as the rational
material-interest-maximizing responses of people (not Japanese or
Mexicans) to the logic of their situation.
But when one had done all that, one is still left, as Maureen Mackintosh
makes clear in her last paragraphs, with a wide range of national
differences which remain unaccounted for and which it seems only
reasonable to ascribe to cultural differences. At that point the
sociologist tends to fudge, to look the other way, or at best to refer to
the importance of 'national character' or 'cultural traditions' (I have
done it myself, sheepishly putting the words in quotes by way of
apology for mentioning the subject) and leave it at that. There are at
least four reasons for this: because this is an immensely difficult field to
handle in any genuinely scientific manner; because, for absurd reasons
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of academic tribalism, most sociologists are scared of being accused of
'psychologism' - and these problems do require an overtly
psychological approach; and thirdly, because discussions of 'national
character', 'modal personality' or 'cultural tradition' smack of racism;
and who wants to be called a racist?
The fourth reason is more respectable: because national character is not
something anybody can do much about, whereas, say, the institutional
structure of labour legisation, or relations of cultural dependency, are
amenable to social engineering. There is indeed a case for concentrating
one's research on the aspects of developing country situations about
which something can be done. But to do so does not require that one
ignores or denies the importance of these other cultural factors in
determining outcomes. If one does, one ends up with a partial,
unconvincing and probably naively optimistic view of the situation.
One also offends the sense of plausibility of, and loses the chance to
communicate with, the 'practical men' who conduct their daily business
on the common-sense assumption that these differences of national
character are of enormous importance. And so, naturally, the practical
men turn to the writers who do acknowledge the factors that seem to
them important - to the Peter Bauers of this world, who are happy to
talk about national character because they do not mind being called
racists.
Our industrial relations research has, I think, 'pushed back the frontiers
of the residues' just a little bit, shown some of the common features of
industrial relations systems in LDCs which can be explained in terms of
similar situational logics and simple interest-maximizing motives -
though not necessarily, by any means, the features that the hypotheses
suggested. And that, I suppose, is a contribution - as Miguel Sanchez
Padron suggests in his last paragraph, if we do nothing more than
prompt people to think through the manifold implications of adapting
rich country labour market and personnel management institutions,
designed for situations in which the average length of an employment
relation is 2½ years, to situations in which it is likely to be 15 or 25
years, we shall have achieved something. But I wonder whether just
pushing back the frontiers of the residues is enough; whether we should
not, more explicitly, have sallied forth among the residues and studied
them?
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